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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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# Central Intelligence Bulletin

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19 August 1967

25X

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#### CONTENTS

Congo (Kinshasa): New anti-European demonstrations possible if Schramme does not capitulate. (Page 4)

Greece: Security officials see signs of opposition and fear trouble from students. (Page 5)

Dominican Republic: Conflict will probably intensify between factions of major opposition party. (Page 6)

<u>Uruguay</u>: Coup rumors reflect deteriorating political and economic conditions. (Page 7)

Somali Republic: Relations with neighbors (Page 8)

**Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt** 

Congo (Kinshasa): Mobutu's mass organization is threatening new anti-European demonstrations if rebel leader Schramme fails to capitulate.

The organization, whose activists are unrepentant in the wake of their sacking of the Belgian Embassy on 14 August, issued a communiqué on 17 August which warned of country-wide demonstrations unless Schramme is out of the country by 24 August. The section in Katanga Province, where Europeans are already very jittery, jumped the gun and was planning a rally for 20 August until Mobutu forbade it.

Many Congolese regard the threat of anti-European violence as a way to increase pressure on foreign governments to use whatever influence they have over Schramme. The principal effect of further violence, however, would be to accelerate the already brisk thinning out of Europeans in the Congo. So far departures have been largely confined to dependents, but technicians who are essential to the cash economy may well begin to move out if the situation worsens.

The Belgian ambassador considers the situation so serious that he is asking Brussels for authorization to offer Belgian troops to fight against Schramme. Such an offer would be hard for Mobutu to accept even if Brussels can be persuaded to make it.

Efforts to extricate the rebels from the eastern Congo, meanwhile, are not going well. The Rwandans, apprehensive over the prospect of having mercenaries and Katangan troops in their country, have delayed giving their approval to the negotiation effort. Schramme may not be able to guarantee the cooperation of the Katangans even if he and the mercenaries agree to

move out.

25X1

19 Aug 67

Greece: Some Greek security officials are concerned over resistance activity and fear trouble from students when schools reopen next month.	

25X1

Although reportedly to be suspended by the King, the five-year sentence given this week to former foreign minister Averof for a trifling violation suggests that some of the coup leaders thought the situation serious enough for the courts to make an example of Averof.

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Although resistance activities may be expected to increase and intensify as the people generally become more disillusioned with the regime, there is no group outside the military establishment with a capability in being of unseating the government. Security officials may fear, however, that student demonstrations and other resistance activities could encourage dissidents within the military to organize.

25X1

<u>Dominican Republic</u>: Recent developments in the major opposition party will probably intensify the conflict between its moderates and radicals.

Secretary General Pena's reaffirmation of the Dominican Revolutionary Party's "nationalist-revolutionary" line is in sharp contrast with the more moderate posture adopted by acting secretary general Mainardi during Pena's two-month trip abroad.

Pena, who returned on 14 August, also announced the withdrawal of Juan Bosch's resignation as senior adviser to the party. His statement that "a complete identification of viewpoints exists" between Bosch and the party suggests that the ex-president will continue to play an influential role in party affairs. Pena also said the party would establish regular liaison with Bosch, who is in self-imposed exile in Spain.


Short-term prospects seem to point to continued disorganization, internal conflict, and a resultant lack of a cohesive or consistent party policy.

<u>Uruguay</u>: A flurry of coup rumors in Montevideo reflects the rapidly deteriorating economic and political conditions.

Public confidence in the government has steadily eroded since President Gestido took office in March. Political in-fighting has destroyed the effectiveness of the ruling Colorado Party. Acute inflation, which the government is unable to check, has given the Communists a popular issue with which to provoke strikes. Cabinet ministers are pessimistic about the government's ability to cope with these problems, and Gestido himself is reported to be greatly discouraged.

Discontented politicians and military leaders—members of both the government and the opposition Blanco Party—are said to be considering various ways out of the morass. Jorge Batlle, Gestido's chief rival and leader of the most powerful sector of the Colorado Party, is rumored to have talked to key opposition leaders about forming a national union government. There is speculation that Gestido may step aside and appoint a prime minister to run the government. Some Blanco military leaders, who are perennial coup plotters but do not now occupy key posts, are also reported to be plotting again. Gestido, a retired general, is rumored to be considering disbanding Congress and ruling by decree.

None of these ideas appears to have progressed beyond the discussion phase, and less drastic measures, such as cabinet changes, labor crackdowns, and belt-tightening economic decrees, could still be tried. Unless the President can soon demonstrate some headway in resolving the country's pressing problems, however, an unconstitutional solution may become increasingly attractive.



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#### NOTE

Somali Republic: The new Somali prime minister, Mohamed Egal, says that the commander of the Somali Army is touring Somalia's troubled border areas as a first step toward halting cross-border guerrilla activities supported and directed by the army. Egal hopes in this way to show that he would like to improve relations with Ethiopia and Kenya. These countries would welcome such a move, but will remain determined to keep control of the Somali-inhabited areas within their borders. Moreover, Egal may incur intense domestic criticism for appearing soft on "Somali unity."

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25X1	Top Scot 61 Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP79T00975A01020017000	1-9
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